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STATE OF ARIZONA,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI

Plaintiff,

VS.

STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,

Defendant.

CAUSE NO. P1300CR201001325

STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Assigned to Hon. Gary Donahoe

The State of Arizona, by and through Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County Attorney and her deputy undersigned moves this court to reconsider the admissibility of the listed evidence precluded in the first trial (CR20081339). A partial court transcript precluding admissibility for each listed category is attached hereto.

UBS Emails and Defendant' cell phone records

Email to Defendant's assistant Jennifer Rydzewski on July 2, 2008 at 3:34 p.m. saying: "Jennifer would you mind closing this account. And then setting if on fire and burying it? Thanks!" This was a joint bank account with Carol Kennedy. Emails with Carol Kennedy dated February 29, 2008 (discussing bills) and July 1, 2008 (discussing the 401(k) account) and emails dated June 23, 24, 2008 to James VanSteenhuyse and Barbara O'Non on their business split agreement.

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The emails and Defendant's cell phone records more than 72 hours from the murder precluded for late disclosure on April 8, 2010.

Defendant's records for 12 months previous to July 2, 2008 are relevant to establish a course of cell phone habits compared to when his cell phone was powered off for 4.5 hours on the night of the murder. March 3 and 14, 2008 phone records between Defendant and Mathiason Tri-Gas pertain to the purchase of carbon monoxide. See also Defendant's computer searches for carbon monoxide discussed below. This evidence is probative of premeditation.

Transcript dated April 8, 2010, pages 10, 11 and 12 attached as exhibit no. 1.

Defendant's statements

Defendant statements to O'Non about: being a \$1 million in debt (made 2007/08); wishing Carol dead; Carol's death was an accident on July 3, 2008; and marriage proposals (just after the murder and before arrest) were precluded for lack of foundation and/or being unduly prejudicial on March 30, 2010.

Defendant told detectives he and Carol discussed reconciliation 2 days before the murder at a time he was intimately involved with three other women, i.e. Renee Girard, Barb O'Non and Laurie Spira. Defendant's statements to O'Non are probative of premeditation, motive and credibility.

Transcript dated March 30, 2010, pages 93 to 98 attached as exhibit no. 2.

UBS computer time log

The UBS computer log in/out times on July 2, 2008 precluded for late disclosure on April 28, 2010. Defendant told detectives that he returned to the office after 10:08 p.m. on July 2, 2008 to turn off his UBS computer. The computer logs are relevant for a time line and credibility of Defendant.

Transcript dated April 28, 2010, pages 187 to 190 attached as exhibit no. 3.

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American Express and Bank of America records

Defendant/s America Express bank records and Bank of America records for the Kennedy Probate were precluded for late disclosure on April 28, 2010. These bank records are probative of motive for the murder and fraud schemes charge involving the Testamentary Trust. Transcript dated April 28, 2010, pages 198 to 202 attached as exhibit no. 4.

Recorded jail calls

On January 22, 2010 court ordered the State to indentify by February 6, 2010 the jail calls through December 31, 2009 it intended to use at trial. State's disclosed the jail calls in supplements #46 (1/29/09), #48 (3/3/10), #57 (4/5/10) and #62 (4/21/10). Transcript dated January 22, 2010, pgs. 101 to 107 attached as exhibit 5.

On April 13, 2010 the court precluded "some" jail calls through December 31, 2009 that were not identified for use in the State's case in chief. The State's supplement #46 complied with the court's deadline disclosure order. However, there is no record of the specific jail calls precluded through December 21, 2009 and no record of the admissibility of disclosed jail calls after the February 6, 2010. The jail calls are relevant as statements against interest involving the Testamentary trust, voice in the vent, anonymous email.

Transcript dated April 13, 2010, pages 40 to 47 attached as exhibit no. 6.

Search for carbon monoxide

In March 2008 Defendant researches "use of carbon monoxide in suicides" and business plant safety plan. On March 3 and 14, 2008 phone records show calls between Defendant and Mathison Tri-Gas. In March Defendant obtains a federal business tax number (EIN), a prerequisite to purchase carbon monoxide. On May 7, 2008 Defendant filled out a Mathison Tri-Gas delivery form with the new EIN. The plan was aborted when Defendant was told to submit a

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detailed storage plan to be inspected before delivery of the gas. This evidence is probative of 1 2 premeditation. 3 On January 15, 2010, the court precluded this information for being unfairly prejudicial 4 under Rule 403. Transcript dated January 15, 2010 pages 21 to 25 attached as exhibit no. 7 and as 5 noted under phone records above, precluded for late disclosure on April 8, 2010. 6 CONCLUSION 7 The State moves this court to reconsider the enumerated evidence categories contained 8 9 herein for admission at trial with appropriate foundation. 10 **RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED** this 18th day of January, 2012. 11 Sheila Sullivan Polk YAVAPAI COUNTY ATTORNEY 12 13 14 15 COPY of the foregoing Emailed this 16 18th day of January, 2012, to: 17 Honorable Gary Donahoe 18 Division 1 Yavapai County Superior Court 19 Via email to Cheryl Wagster: C.Wagster@courts.az.gov 20 Craig Williams 21 Attorney for Defendant P.O Box 26692 22 Prescott Valley, AZ 86312 Via email to <u>craigwilliamslaw@gmail.com</u> 23

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By:

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1	APRIL 8, 2010 2:50 P.M.
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3	PRETRIAL MOTIONS
4	APPEARANCES: FOR THE STATE: MR. JOE BUTNER AND MR. JEFF
5	PAPOURE.
6	FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY HAMMOND AND MS. ANNE CHAPMAN.
7	(THE FOLLOWING IS A PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE
8	PROCEEDINGS HELD ON APRIL 8, 2010:)
9	MR. SEARS: Before we go, we are under the
10	impression, from things that you said yesterday, that we
11	might hear from you on all of the motions that were under
12	advisement and the motions that were briefed today.
13	THE COURT: I can do that, if you wish.
14	MR. SEARS: We would very much like to hear
15	that, Your Honor.
16	There is an issue with regard to a
17	supplemental brief filed late this morning by the State.
18	THE COURT: I haven't seen that.
19	MR. BUTNER: Let me give you a copy at this
20	time, Judge, and sorry that you haven't seen that.
21	THE COURT: Then we won't recess.
22	(Whereupon, the Court reviews a document.)
23	MR. BUTNER: Does the Court wish to hear any
24	additional argument?
25	THE COURT: I don't think so. I have heard
1	from both sides, substantially, each of the issues that were
2	raised in the various motions.
3	I think there are a couple of
4	observations that I ought to make. I recognize that both
5	sides have an obligation of disclosure. Rule 15.1 requires

24	040810 DeMocker partial.txt the obtaining of the bank information, I don't think that a
25	sanction is appropriate. I think that sufficient diligence
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1	was used with regard to obtaining even the more recently
2	discovered bank account. But sanctions, I think, are
3	appropriate with regard to what I have mentioned and
4	inclusive of the large amount of e-mails. I am not
5	persuaded, frankly, with regard to the UBS e-mails that
6	relate to the back and forth between Mr. DeMocker and
7	Miss Kennedy that preceded the divorce are relevant or
8	probative on the issues of this case. That has to do with
9	something that occurred a couple of months after the divorce
10	decree was issued or agreed upon. And commonplace in the UBS
11	are back and forth on property settlement issues and that
12	sort of thing that, frankly, are not that probative or
13	relevant with regard to what took place in this case.
14	To the extent that there is financial
15	information contained in there that the expert for either
16	side may rely upon, if that is contested in some fashion, I
17	may allow those to be used for impeachment purposes. But in
18	terms of substantively admitting those, I don't see that it
19	adds anything, therefore, is more subject to sanction by
20	preclusion than other information may be.
21	Similarly, the State urged that the
22	Barbara O'non back and forth to purportedly corroborate
23	Miss O'non's testimony that she talked about when she was in
24	front of me in the last couple of weeks, to the extent that
25	it is simply corroboration, then it is cumulative and not
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1	that necessary to the State's case. And since there was a
2	late, and I think without due diligence, disclosure of those,
3	I am not of a mind to change my mind about precluding those. Page 10

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4	In terms of communications between
5	Mr. DeMocker and Miss Kennedy within the 72 hours in advance
6	of her death, I think that those are more probative and less
7	subject to sanction, even with the delayed discovery, and
8	those may be allowed by the Court.
9	Communications after the fact that
10	reflect that Mr. DeMocker uses a cell phone, I don't think
11	are particularly relevant, unless there is a necessary
12	impeachment of a witness concerning that. And so, I think I
13	will reserve the right to modify an order of preclusion with
14	regard to those, if there is an impeachment issue. But,
15	generally speaking, I don't see that as needful testimony.
16	would find it to be cumulative, and therefore, the
17	information is more subject to preclusion as a sanction for
18	that reason, having considered the importance to the
19	respective cases.
20	Communications about to someone named
21	Jennifer, and I think it was No. 196 or 197, doesn't seem
22	particularly probative of anything. And that one I would
23	preclude for late disclosure purposes.
24	So in general, speaking of particular
25	items, I think that there are some things that are probative,
1	and I am not going to preclude, but most of that information,
2	I think that it comes under the same rubric that I adopted
3	about it being late disclosed and subject to sanction.
4	The Barrs decision says that the Court
5	ought to consider whether one or other party will suffer harm
6	from the granting of a continuance, and I think that a
7	continuance is not appropriate under these circumstances,
8	having regard to the Court's calendar, having regard to the

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9	jury selection process that has already commenced, and having
10	regard to the lateness of the effort made, the diligence with
11	regard to investigation and disclosure.
12	So what sanction is appropriate, having
13	found there to be a violation of the letter and the spirit of
14	Rule 15. And as I say, I have determined that I don't think
15	striking the death penalty entirely is appropriate. I have
16	determined that other than the exclusion of a large number of
17	UBS records and e-mails, I think it is appropriate to strike
18	the two two of the three remaining aggravating factors,
19	and that is my sanction that I am going to employ in the
20	case. And that will leave the State with aggravating factor
21	(f)(5), the pecuniary aggravating factor in the case.
22	Does that answer your question,
23	Mr. Sears?
24	MR. SEARS: Yes, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Any clarification needed by the
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1	State?
2	MR. BUTNER: So, Judge, just to clarify then,
3	the shoe print evidence is not precluded?
4	THE COURT: That's correct.
5	MR. BUTNER: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: But that is part of the whole
7	consideration of what's taken place in the case. And a
8	sanction for that is the striking of the 703(f)(2)
9	aggravating factor.
10	MR. BUTNER: I understand.
11	THE COURT: Anything further today that you
12	need to have me clarify?
13	MR. BUTNER: Nothing further from the State.
14	MR. SEARS: No, Your Honor.
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ORIGINAL SUPERIOR COURT ONLY AS ZONA

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1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 2010 APR 12 PH 1:53/
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI
3	S. KELBAUGH BY:
4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,
6	vs.) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant.)
9)
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG
12	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION SIX
13	YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA
15	TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2010 3:06 P.M.
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
18	PRETRIAL MOTIONS
19	TESTIMONY OF BARBARA O'NON
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24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR
25	Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50808

this testimony. So it really goes to character and asks the jury to essentially find that because he was angry on two specific occasions with Miss O'non, that he was also angry and could have carried out a murder of his then ex-wife.

So I think that prejudicial value is significantly outweighing the probative value for this testimony. I am going to preclude the evidence of the two instances of what Miss O'non testified about. And a good part of that is the lack of any real notion as to when it happened, circumstances of whether anybody else witnessed it.

But honestly, the nature of what it is being used for -- and I think it is being used for impermissible character evidence rather than any permissible purpose -- but nonetheless, in a 403 weighing, I would find that the evidence is unduly prejudicial versus its very limited probative value, and it doesn't prove increasing anger over time. There was no fear -- though there was some sudden surprise at the way in which the defendant behaved on the particular occasions -- that there wasn't any threat or any longstanding fear, given what the rest of the testimony was about the further relationships.

Testimony about other statements made by the defendant or characterizations of the defendant as being unhappy over paying a large sum of money, I don't think the characterization is allowable. There are problems with

regard to the foundation as to when that is occurring. There are foundational problems with regard to -- and she couldn't give any time frame on when Mr. DeMocker allegedly made the statement about possibly being a million dollars in debt. I think that is also lacking in foundation and unduly prejudicial. I am going to preclude that.

With regard to the general breakup of the business relationship, I think that is not prior bad act material. I think that its simply descriptive of what was going on in the year or so or actually the few months prior to Carol Kennedy's death. I think that's relevant. I think it is admissible.

Her own notions -- that is to say,

Miss O'non's own notions about having some reluctance to go
on a camping trip, I don't find that probative or relevant.

Her mental state is not at issue in the case. So whether she
was afraid or not afraid to go on a camping trip, I don't
find that information to be admissible or relevant and would
disallow that.

His -- any statement that can -- in which sufficient foundation can be laid, that the feeling by Mr. DeMocker was that the terms of the dissolution were not fair, I think is fair game with regard to his financial status at the time. So I won't preclude that. But I think that there are some real issues with regard to the

foundation. I didn't hear a good foundation with regard to that today, and so there will have to be some careful foundation laid to be able to get into any statements and not characterizations of what was said, but to the best of her ability, a statement of what the defendant said.

Types of shoes that he had. She can't testify that they were identical. She can only testify that there were a large number of running shoes, what she called "tennis shoes." She can testify about the shoes, but I don't think she can say anything about the particular shoes in Exhibit 169. She simply wasn't attentive to that.

The request to marry multiple times, I don't find that probative of any particular issue in the case. I am going to preclude that. I don't find that information relevant or whether there were proposals to other women relevant for any genuine purpose at issue in the case. I will preclude that finding that -- that ruling supported by 404, as well as by 403.

I don't know that spending the night together on a couple of occasions, when both are consenting adults, after the divorce had been granted, is something that is prejudicial.

The story of what the defendant was doing and where he was in terms of admission by a party I think is permissible. I think there was sufficient clarity as to when

that discussion took place. So that is allowable, but as I understand it, it's basically the same story that the defendant gave the police -- more or less. So in general, I think she can testify about her financial relationship, about the fact that they had a personal relationship.

Wishing Carol dead on occasions, I didn't find sufficient foundation for precisely what was said. I don't think it what wishing that Carol was dead. I do think it was more along the lines that Mr. Sears indicated the testimony was, that "they," which I think refers to either himself and/or children, would be better off. But I think that carries such a potential prejudicial bombshell that I think that the prejudicial value significantly outweighs the probative value as far as that goes. So I will rule that inadmissible.

Other questions that I haven't addressed that you think I need to?

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, there was the -- the statement that was elicited about whether Mr. DeMocker told her that this was an accident. I think the inference from the State was that they would want the jury to draw was that Mr. DeMocker was lying to her, that he knew by the time that he had this conversation that it was not necessarily an accident. She said on cross-examination that she couldn't remember what it was, but she was leaning towards what I was

suggesting, which was that Mr. DeMocker told her that the police said it might have been an accident. The prejudicial effect of that in the 403 balancing, I think, would point to the exclusion of that, because the State would simply want that out there for the jury to think that Mr. DeMocker was lying and covering up what he had done.

THE COURT: I don't think she was sufficiently definite on that issue to allow that testimony, given what your lack of recollection was. So I will disallow that, as well.

MR. SEARS: There were two other areas, Your Honor. One of them was a new area for us, at least, where she was allowed on redirect to say that Mr. DeMocker didn't express any remorse.

THE COURT: That was an issue I was about to take up. I don't think that -- first of all, I don't think that that comment was a statement. It was more a characterization that there wasn't anything that was said.

I think if he is -- if he is the one that did the harm to Ms. Kennedy, then one may expect some sort of remorse, potentially, for that, and what his mental state is. If he is the one that didn't do the harm to Ms. Kennedy, I think different people can react in different ways with regard to that, and I think it carries a high degree of prejudice and isn't very probative of whether he had anything



SUPERIOR COURT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 1 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAYARAL HICKS. CLERK 2 3 S. KELBAUGH 4 THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 5 Plaintiff, P1300 6 No. CR 2008-1339 vs. 7 STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER, 8 Defendant. 9 10 BEFORE: 11 THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 12 DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA 13 14 PRESCOTT, ARIZONA WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010 15 1:39 P.M. 16 REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 17 PRETRIAL MOTIONS 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Court Reporter 25 Certificate No. 50808

Miss Hinsch from testifying or from the State presenting a report concerning that. If there is something really distinct that she winds up with, I suppose I may -- you may wish to have me reconsider that decision, Mr. Butner, but at this point here we are right before the trial. I am not sure that I would reconsider it. I am not giving you any guarantees that I would.

MR. BUTNER: I understand, Judge.

THE COURT: It seems to me it would have to be thoroughly critical to the State's case and distinct from what some other computer expert might say, so that there is some overriding necessity to do it. And I suppose I will probably need some explanation as to why it was not done earlier than what it was.

Ms. Chapman, next.

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. The next is a document that was disclosed that lists date, time and activity. It was disclosed, I think --

THE COURT: Is that the log-in, log-out allegedly for UBS?

MS. CHAPMAN: Allegedly. The document isn't identified that way. It is identified by the State that way. There is no indication at all where that came from or who provided it or when it was provided. It was disclosed to us on March 23rd. There is no way for us to determine what it

1 is. Mr. DeMocker was arrested approximately 16 months before 2 it was disclosed to us at UBS. So I don't know why it is 3 being disclosed to us now. 4 THE COURT: For clarification sake in my mind, 5 did the dates on this log-in, log-out for UBS relate back to some earlier time when Mr. DeMocker was not in custody? 6 7 MS. CHAPMAN: They do, Your Honor. best of my recollection, they do. But again, I don't have 8 9 any way to determine where that came from or how it was 10 created. It literally is a chart, time, date, and activity. 11 It doesn't say log-in, log-out. It doesn't say anything about UBS. It doesn't say anything about Mr. DeMocker. 12 THE COURT: Do you know a beginning date or 13 14 end date? 15 MS. CHAPMAN: I think it is June and July of 16 '08, Your Honor. THE COURT: So, in the time frame within a 17 month or more so before the death of Ms. Kennedy. 18 MS. CHAPMAN: Sure, yes. That is the best of 19 20 my memory, Your Honor. The State's reply indicates that it 21 accidentally overlooked this document. We have had, as you 22 know, literally I would guesstimate in the 20 -- actually, I 23 know we have received over 20,000 pages of disclosure from 24 UBS and UBS-related entities in the form of e-mails and 25

1 otherwise.

So, Your Honor, at this point in the absence of some other explanation that it was just overlooked, and given that we don't have any idea what it is, where it came from, or when it was disclosed to the State, we'd ask Your Honor to preclude it. I simply don't know what it is.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Apparently, Judge, it is a log-in, log-out sheet on Mr. DeMocker's computer, his UBS computer, and it was provided to the State very early on in this case. I believe by way of subpoena. It went through Mr. Henzy, the attorney that was representing UBS at that time, and he directly provided that particular record. And for some reason, it did not get disclosed. And that's where it came from. And it comes from UBS. Basically, they are saying that that is their record. I guess, they somehow kept this kind of a log record. It is a very plain sheet of paper with just this log-in, log-out type of information. And we overlooked it.

THE COURT: Critical need for the State's case is what?

MR. BUTNER: It is not a critical need to the State's case. It kind of establishes when the defendant came to work on July the 2nd and when he checked out of work and

that kind of thing. And there is a period of time right around that same time frame.

THE COURT: Doesn't sound like a critical need, and does sound like it wasn't disclosed in a timely fashion. I am going to exclude it.

MS. CHAPMAN: Moving on. The next is with respect to a witness, Dan Jensen: Mr. Jensen was disclosed as an expert on March 26. We weren't provided with any CV or any report. He was just listed in the disclosure. Your Honor ordered the identification of witnesses on April 12th. He was not listed as an expert in that list. He was, however, listed as a custodian of records.

As Your Honor knows, the cell tower information has been an issue in this case since November of 2008. It was at that time that the defense made repeated requests for this information as it relates to Mr. Knapp.

Today in the State's reply that I received this morning, they are now identifying him again as an expert on Sprint cell towers, the capability of Sprint cell phone network, and the manner in which Sprint keeps track of time logs on Sprint cell phones, coverage map of Sprint cell phone towers. Apparently, he is now offered as an expert on those areas. Again, we don't have a CV. We don't have a report. He wasn't disclosed as an expert on the April 12th list. And the State has known the cell tower



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and I thought it would be appropriate to present matters of public record that they had filed a previous divorce petition and then abandoned that action. That is why I offered those records.

THE COURT: At this point in terms of the State's case in chief, I am going the preclude it. But in terms of if there are issues that may need rebutting based on -- for impeachment purposes, I will revisit the issue if you wish me to.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, we had filed a motion to preclude with respect to two different sets of -- excuse me. Hi, Phil.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held re potential jury panel which was reported but is not contained herein.)

THE COURT: While we are doing that,

Ms. Chapman, what other issues are you still looking at?

Bank records and photos?

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

with respect to bank records, we had filed motions to preclude with respect to two sets of Bank of America records and the American Express records. The State only responded with respect to American Express. And I think what the State's response is is essentially that Your Honor, in your earlier ruling, decided that you weren't going to

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preclude any bank records based on late disclosure, which wasn't my understanding of what you had decided.

And so with respect to one of the Bank of America records in particular, these relate to the estate records of which Katie DeMocker was the executrix. The State was aware of those certainly as early as October '08. did not disclose them to us until April 2nd. They are not at I don't know how they would be relevant. And all relevant. we ask Your Honor to preclude those in particular, but there are three sets of bank records disclosed in April.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I am not sure about the records of Katherine DeMocker as executrix of that B of A account, and I can't think of the relevance of those. the other records are efforts to get the complete records from the defendant's bank accounts, which were numerous, and we had difficulty getting complete records, and we discovered that we didn't have complete records for those accounts, The National Bank records and B of A accounts and also the American Express account. That is why we subpoenaed those records again and again and again. There is so many of them that it was hard to keep going through them and analyzing and finding where they were missing.

THE COURT: And the import of those for the State's case?

THE COURT: Some people do that.

MR. BUTNER: Well, Judge, quite frankly, all of these bank records have been marked as an exhibit, but it is unlikely that the State is going to be putting in all of these bank records. But Mr. Echols has relied upon statements from all of these bank accounts. And we wanted to make sure that we had all of the complete account records for each of these accounts, rather than just, for example, the latest statements, so to speak, to support his opinions. And that is why we subpoensed all of these records. They are critical to the State's case in that regard, although they may very well not end up in evidence in this case.

THE COURT: But he rendered the opinion without the records?

MR. BUTNER: He didn't render the opinion without the records, per se, Judge. It is just, for example, you can look at bank account records, you can see that he had "X" number of dollars at this point in time. If they skip several months, you can see he had "X" number of dollars at this point in time. You have a statement here and you have a statement there. You can fill in the gaps. That is the kind of thing that was done with these sorts of records. That includes the American Express records, too. Mr. DeMocker lived using credit cards, basically, all of the time rather than money.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, might I interrupt. If we have an answer, I know Phil is waiting.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held re potential jury panel which was reported but is not contained herein.)

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, we are very close and I will go as fast as Roxanne will let me go.

With respect to the bank records, back to the bank records, Your Honor. It is very hard for us, and I think it is obvious from Mr. Butner's response that it is very hard for to us to know what to do with all these records. We keep receiving them. If Mr. Echols is going to rely on them, then we have to be able to review them.

Mr. Echols hasn't created or drafted another opinion or report since it was generated and will not be offered, we understand. So I am not sure what to do with that information.

What I can tell you specifically with respect to those Bank of America account records for Katie as the executrix of the estate, I don't think those have any relevance to the issues that Mr. Butner identified earlier.

THE COURT: I think he conceded that.

MS. CHAPMAN: We are asking Your Honor to preclude those. At some point the State has to stop.

Mr. Echols has to stop.

THE COURT: The Court will preclude the newly

disclosed records from April 2nd, since they were not relied upon for purposes of evaluating the records and providing the opinion. The State agrees the reason for the records was to support Mr. Echols' opinion. He has not changed his report.

newly disclosed, I will preclude them. If they are absolutely necessary for impeachment or rehabilitation purposes, after attack or cross-examination by the other side, I may revisit whether some of those may be able to be used. But don't count on my reversing course on that. But in the interests of the truth seeking process and fairness, I may revisit that for selected purposes.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, the last two issues, one is with respect to this photo disk of Y-Y, which were photos of the 840 Country Club. Those accompany the report that the State acknowledged last time that they had no justification for disclosing late. So those photos were taken at that same time. I believe sometime in '08.

THE COURT: What is the relevance for 840 Country Club at all?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, in the State's response, which apparently you didn't get, the State -- we indicated that basically the photos show -- the most important thing is they show the residence, but they show the instructions that were left at the residence on how to use the Internet. And

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	TONY CONY
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 2:09
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI
3	B. Hamilton
4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,
6	vs.) $f(300)$) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant.
9)
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
12	DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
13	
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 2010
15	8:59 A.M.
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	HEARING ON MOTIONS
18	TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JAIME CICERO
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR
25	Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50808

MR. BUTNER: Okay.

THE COURT: Before you do, I recognize that the parties have been making arrangements, for example, with labs to test in commonalty some of the remaining exhibits. And so to the extent that a report hasn't been prepared with regard to that, I will probably not preclude that information. But if there is anything that is disclosed that pertains to what has already been done before today, and it is not disclosed by the 6th of February, I am probably going to preclude it.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. That clarified exactly what I wish to draw to the Court's attention. I appreciate that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Miss Chapman, next?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I think that the remaining item here is with respect to Item No. 5, which are the defendant's statements. And the State's reply is that it intends to rely on specific statements, and then all of the statements that is provided to us in Mr. DeMocker's jail calls. I think you heard the number is over 2700 calls. We had parts of them up through August transcribed. That is approximately 25,000 pages of transcription. That leaves us with several other months. It is an incredibly costly and

expensive and time consuming process. And we would ask that the State identify -- let me back up for a minute.

We also don't have any reports or summaries or other documentation about what is happening with those calls, and do have some information that they are being listened to because search warrants have arisen as a result of some of those conversations, so we would like to request some of those reports and summaries. And also an identification of what, if any, of those calls that the State actually intends to rely on.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, there were some summaries done early on. It became overly burdensome. They are not really doing summaries anymore. We can provide them with the summaries that have been done, but there aren't summaries being done and haven't been done for quite some time. We are providing the conversations. I will request that we get an updated amount of the conversations to the defense. It would seem to me that we can provide them with the recorded conversations through the end of December. I think that is about as much as we have looked at, at this point anyway, and we will do that. We can do that, I suppose, by the end of next week. But in terms of reports and things of that nature, those aren't being done.

THE COURT: How do you know you intend to use

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any of them if they haven't been listened to, if they haven't been summarized, if there is nothing relevant on them to nail down which ones you are going to use or not use?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I didn't say they haven't been listened to. They have been listened to. And ultimately I am going to have to go back and listen to some jail phone calls and pick out the ones that we need to use.

THE COURT: If they have been listened to, if they have some relevant information on them, then hasn't there been some type of reporting that would identify which ones may have relevancy from those that are simply, pardon the expression, background noise to the case?

MR. BUTNER: Like I said, there were some summaries done early on, but there have not been summaries done as of late.

THE COURT: Those for which summaries have been done, is there relevant information on them that you think you are going to use?

MR. BUTNER: Not very much, Judge. We will disclose the summaries that have been done, as I stated.

THE COURT: And those that do have information that is relevant and possibly admissible, can you identify the call or date or time or CD, some fashion of identifying what it is the information is that you are going to want to propose putting in front of the jury?

MR. BUTNER: Understand the people that have been listening to these jail phone calls, and this is why there aren't many summaries done, are volunteers, so to speak, for the most part. On occasion some deputies that were on leave, or something of that nature, limited duty kind of deputies that listen to the phone calls. They have not been doing reports on them. I am going to have to listen to what a volunteer thinks might have been important. And I don't have summaries of that stuff. To the extent that I do have summaries from early on, I will do that.

THE COURT: How many items are there, do you think, out of the 2700 or so that I am told exist?

MR. BUTNER: I have no idea.

MS. CHAPMAN: We haven't received any summaries, so the record is clear, of any phone calls.

THE COURT: Okay. And when can you provide the summaries and/or transcripts and/or notes that pertain to these calls? When can you provide those to the defense?

MR. BUTNER: Well, I have never seen them,

Judge, so I really don't know. How about within -- let's

just say by February the 12th, I will be able to have

garnered that information, because I don't even know where to ask at this point.

THE COURT: I guess that answer confuses me. Do you need to consult with your staff at all for that

information?

MR. BUTNER: I don't think my staff knows either. I think that information is, like I said, it was being handled by volunteers. And so that is why I give to the Court about, you know, several -- a couple of weeks here, because I don't know where that information is. I don't know what it is going to take to get it together.

THE COURT: All right. For those calls that have been obtained through December 31st of 2009, I will order that you identify in some clear fashion, which of those items you intend to use. And because I am not privy to the manner of how they have been disclosed so far, I guess I am uncertain as to how to do it in any other fashion than identifying the call by date and number and the proposed information contained in that.

been obtained through the 31st of December by means of a report that has already been done or a transcript, that you provide that information, if it exists, to the defense no later than the 6th of February. And if you intend to use any of the calls, you will need to identify them that occurred -- those that occurred before December 31st, 2009, no later than the same date, so that they don't have to type up a transcript of every call that was ever made at great expense and difficulty.

I imagine that most of this is, pardon the expression, background noise to the case that has nothing to do with the facts of the case and probably isn't relevant to anything else. To the extent that you have these calls and you intend -- if you have disclosed them and intend to use them, they have to be duplicated. If they haven't been duplicated, they must be duplicated and provided by the 6th.

And I did a somewhat arbitrary cutoff with December 31st for the 6th, and I will go a week later to the 13th for any that are in January through the 13th of February. If you intend to use any of that, that has to be identified so that all of them are identified by date, time, and if possible, some other mechanism of identifying what CD they are on -- if that is the manner of disclosure -- what CD they are on by designation letter, number, however you folks are designating them, or else they may be precluded from any type of use at trial.

What next?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I think that covers the issues that were in the -- in this motion. There are some other issues that we had talked about when we were here last week that we would raise today, time permitting. I don't know if you want to go to those, but I believe that that covers all of the areas that were outlined in the original motion to compel.

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THE COURT: What else did you wish to discuss?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Butner was

provided last Tuesday with a letter addressed to John Kennedy

and Ruth Kennedy, and he was going to advise us whether or

not he would agree to mail those letters. I haven't heard

whether he did mail those letters. So, that is the first

item.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, the Kennedy letters?

MR. BUTNER: I have spoken personally with

John and Ruth Kennedy. Those letters are going to be mailed today.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

with respect to the pending 14 items that were being tested. We did receive a report back from the lab. My understanding is that we were going to receive information about any additional tests that were going to be conducted with respect to the 14 items. And we don't have information about whether any additional testing is anticipated or going to be performed. But we would like to have that information in anticipation of the hearing that you set in early March, where we intend to address the other DNA issues in our in limine motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, that information will be



1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI
3	
4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,)
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant.)
9	,
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
12	DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
13	INVITAL GOONTLY MALZONA
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010
15	11:11 A.M. A.M. SESSION ONLY
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
18	PRETRIAL MOTIONS
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23	
24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR
25	Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50808

So we'd ask Your Honor to limit their use of any and all statements to those statements that it's properly identified.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, first of all, the State has made all kinds of disclosure about all of the statements that Mr. DeMocker has made, starting with, of course, the interviews that took place in close proximity to the crime, and then thereafter there were other statements that were discovered that were disclosed to the defense, and they have been noticed in terms of the statements made to all those people that were identified. They are all set forth in the reports.

THE COURT: In terms of identifying them, we are not talking about the ones that were made to law enforcement. They are conceding to that point.

Apparently, we are talking about jail visits or statements that are attributed to Mr. DeMocker from civilian witnesses, not law enforcement personnel.

MR. BUTNER: Well, those are very different sorts of statements.

THE COURT: I understand that.

And so the -- with regard to the jail visits, don't you think that Rule 15.1 requires you to provide the recording of the statement?

1 MR. BUTNER: Yes. 2 THE COURT: And don't those have to be timely 3 disclosed? 4 MR. BUTNER: Well, we didn't realize that we 5 were going to need to provide those things until January, and we gathered that stuff up and provided it, Judge. It had 6 7 been being accumulated, in terms of people listening to the 8 calls and making synopsises. 9 When we disclosed it, we were under the 10 order of the Court and of the belief that we needed to disclose the ones that mattered, so to speak, and we 11 identified those with a specific report from Detective 12 13 McDormett. THE COURT: How do the statements fit in to 14 having some probative value on the merits of the case? 15 16 is the nature of the statements, since I don't have access 17 here? 18 There is so many, Judge, that I MR. BUTNER: can't tell you right now, but let me clarify to you. 19 The actual recordings of the jail visits 20 were being disclosed in a timely fashion as we went along. 21 22 It was the synopsises and then the requested additional specificity as to are these important ones that was clarified 23 by the report from Detective McDormett. 24

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In terms of the other statements to other

people, that was made clear right at the outset in the police 1 2 reports. For example, statements to Charlotte DeMocker and 3 Jacob Janusek in close proximity to the time; statements that 4 Mr. DeMocker made to other people about where he was and what 5 he was doing, things of that nature; Rene Gerard -- how he 6 took Rene Gerard out to the scene and showed her around --7 showed her where he rode his bike that day. That's a 8_ statement made by the defendant that was specified in the 9 reports, that were disclosed very early on in this case. 10 THE COURT: And are in constituent recordings 11 from jail conversations? 12 MR. BUTNER: The only ones that are really 13 specified in terms of being relevant and probative -- I think 14 that's what you are asking --15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 16 MR. BUTNER: -- and material, would be the 17 ones that were specified in Detective McDormett's report that 18 came out, basically, shortly after contemporaneously with the 19 January 29 disclosure, is my recollection. 20 THE COURT: And have --21 MR. BUTNER: And we have done another one 22 since then? Okay. We have done another one since then. 23 THE COURT: And in general, what do they 24 purport to prove? They aren't admissions of having committed 25 the offense, I take it.

	MR. BUTNER: No, they aren't that. But they
	are basically various statements along the lines of he was
	experiencing financial pressure or in one instance I think he
	has made a statement as to riding his bike in the area. That
	kind of thing.
	THE COURT: And don't we get to the point of
	cumulative on this stuff?
	MR. BUTNER: It may well be that we would get
	to the point of cumulative on that stuff. That is exactly
	right, Your Honor.
	THE COURT: Okay. Why, if you concede the
-	point, were some disclosures made after the cutoff date that
	I imposed?
	MR. BUTNER: Well, first of all, because we
	didn't think that they were of any significance until they
	were reviewed more carefully, and then it was determined that
	they were relevant to certain issues in the case, and that
	they have been requested. And so we complied with the
	Court's order.
	Now, bear in mind, Judge, we had been
	disclosing the actual recordings all along.
	THE COURT: That was part of my question that
	I think you answered earlier.
	MR. BUTNER: Okay.
	THE COURT: Ms. Chapman.

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MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, this arose originally back in November or December, because we had received over, I think, 2700 jail calls at that time. We continued to receive them, and it is a very large quantity. And that is why at the time Your Honor ordered the State to identify by call time and number and recording number which statements it was going the rely on, so that it could be narrowed down. Because the State originally said "We're going to rely on all 2700 of these calls." And apparently, what I understand the State —

THE COURT: And are you saying that they didn't do that at all?

MS. CHAPMAN: I'm saying they did that with respect to a certain number of calls. They didn't identify them in any way. They didn't say these are the statements we intent to rely on, as Your Honor had ordered.

They provided them in a police report, and they provided them in a thousand summaries and said you should be able to figure out that this is what we meant.

Well, now we understand what they meant, but that is not what happened. They didn't do it in compliance with Your Honor's order.

They later have now disclosed additional reports that they said they intend to rely on that are past the deadline. So frankly, I don't know exactly what they

intend to rely on from these call summaries. And in addition to that, this disclosure that just lists any and all statements defendant made to 16 people doesn't comply with that order either.

We need to know what statements the State intends to use from what dates so that we are prepared and so we can address whether they are cumulative or whether they are relevant. That is what Your Honor's order contemplated. That's what the rule contemplates. That's what will permit us to be prepared to try this case in three weeks, and that's not where we are, based on the State's disclosure.

My understanding of these supplemental reports in March and April -- we continue to get recordings, but these reports are apparently -- although they weren't identified that way when they were disclosed, they've now been identified as statements that the State intends to rely on. They do have statements that were made in November of 2009 and January of 2010. They are being disclosed to us now.

And again, Your Honor, all of these summaries were withheld from us from late -- from January of 2010. We did have the 2700 recordings with no transcripts or summaries that the State was receiving.

So we believe we should have been -- and under your order and under the rule -- provided with notice

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of the statements before today. We weren't provided with that notice before today. We don't presently have the notice. We don't think they've complied with the rule, and we think what they've properly identified are the statements that Mr. DeMocker made to law enforcement on July 2nd and 3rd and October 23rd, and other than that, they haven't complied.

THE COURT: Well, I am going to wrap by the order that I entered previously. And other than recordings that may have taken place after the date -- and I didn't set any time limits with regard to those made subsequent to that, I was concerned about what had already taken place.

I think that the State has not complied with Rule 15.1 in specifically identifying which statements were to be made, and that is what the Court's order was contemplating, so that there could be some true knowledge about what the State regards as probative, relevant statements from particular dates and time frames. To the extent that they've provided summaries that identify by date or a portion of the CD with some specificity, I am going to let them use the statements potentially as far as exclusion is concerned. I still see some other issues with regard to relevance, cumulative, and those sorts of things.

So the recordings, in terms of failure to comply with the Court's order, I am going to sanction as I said I would sanction and preclude those from being used.

But in terms of the identification of phone calls, where the phone calls were provided and some information was provided before the Court's deadlines with regard to which statements were made, I will let the State potentially use those as

against a sanction being imposed for that.

Mr. Butner, I am not clear, and I guess even though they know the case much better than I do in terms of the actual statements, it seems to me that the defense is not clear about -- still -- about what statements on what relevant points Mr. DeMocker may have made in jail, phone calls, and the offer of proof isn't -- to the extent that you discussed that as part of your response, isn't very clarifying to me.

So, if there -- with regard to those statements that you believe you timely disclosed, I think there still needs to be an identification of the statement made, of the timing of it, of what you are going to use in a redacted form. You know, we are less than a month from trial commencing. I recognize that we may not be a month from when the stuff may be used. That may be further on down the road. I think the defense needs that and needs that also by Tuesday of next week. So ordered.

Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, the only thing I would add or ask is that with respect to this list of the

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAT
3	STATE OF ARIZONA
4	STATE OF ARIZONA, JAN 2 8 2010
5	Plaintiff,) JEANNE HICKS, Clerk BY Deputy Deputy
6	vs. No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant. (
9	······································
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
12	DIVISION 6 YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
13	TAVALAT COUNTY, ARTZONA
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 2010 9:47 A.M. SESSION
15	9:47 A.M. SESSION
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON PROCEEDINGS
18	TALL STATE OF THE INTERIOR OF THE STATE OF T
19	<u>Hearing on Motions</u> Motion To Exclude Prior Act Evidence
20	Motion Re: Photos
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23	LISA A. CHANEY, RPR, CSR, CR Certified Reporter
24	Certificate No. 50801
25	ORIGINAL

Book of Business was an issue in her mind. There is no motion for relief filed by her or by anybody else or Mr. Fruge. There's no communications that show up on her computer from Mr. Fruge saying, you know, we got hoodwinked about this Book of Business by Mr. DeMocker.

It was just a position taken in the divorce case that was thoroughly argued and considered by both sides and resolved, and it can't be any simpler than that.

And then to allow the State to continue this unsupported, unwarranted attack on Mr. DeMocker for, you know committing perjury, which is the most -- I think is the most extreme position they took to these allegations that he's committing fraud, that he's misleading the Court, and that he's hiding something, is utterly inappropriate under 404(B) and needs to be blocked right now. So we would ask you to remember all of those things in making a ruling on that. Thank you. I am done.

THE COURT: Generally under Rule 404(A), as you know, evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for purposes of proving action and conformity. 404(B) provides that except as provided in 404(C), which doesn't apply in this particular case, evidence of other crimes or wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove character of a person in order to show action and conformity therewith.

It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as, proof of motive, opportunities, and preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or absence, that is not an exhaustive list of all the purposes for which such evidence may be admitted.

And I readily acknowledge that the act itself has to be proven by clear and convincing evidence for it to be admissible, and then also there's a general relevancy determination is this evidence itself relevant and does it have reason being excluded for purposes of prejudice confusion or waste of time.

So that is the analysis and I do have testimony to rely on. I think that I need some review personally of some the computer evidence to be absolutely certain of my ruling in connection with that, but here's my general ruling and observation.

Premeditation is a portion of what the State must prove in connection with the computer searches that bear on the topic of killing and, I guess, I do have a comment about whether this implicates some kind of demand or potential demand by the jurors for Mr. DeMocker to testify or an undue pressure on him to testify.

I think there is plenty of evidence in the record without Mr. DeMocker testifying that would allow this defense to make an argument that this is something

that is researched for a book based on the files in which the witnesses for the State would have to admit that existed on the computer.

So I guess I disagree with the perception that this would be some kind of undue pressure on the Defendant to have to rebut but I don't disagree with the observation about one of the retrieved items under a general search, was even the smallest things can attack, and that that had reference to a joke cite or that sort of thing.

So in terms of bringing that information before a jury I don't find that the fifth amendment of rights would be unnecessarily implicated. It's acknowledged by I suspect by both sides that whoever killed Carol Kennedy may have premeditated it to some degree at least at the time of executing the blows and observation about -- at least my recollection of the facts, I find that the fact of the research existed and existed on Mr. DeMocker's own computer and that there is sufficient evidence with regard to identity of who is doing the search.

I think the real argument becomes more for what was being searched for and for what purpose and was it to write a book and that sort of thing. The fact is that the research took place and I find by clear and convincing evidence that that research took place and that

Mr. DeMocker did it based on the evidence before me. I think that more to the point -- and I do find that it fits within the type of information for which it's admissible under 404(B) for purposes of knowledge, motive, plan. And the question I think comes down to relevancy and to the degree of probative value being out weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading of the jury.

I think, therefore, based on my recollection of the evidence that the evidence with regard to how to kill and make it look like a suicide is admissible.

With regard to the specific research and the evaluation or obtaining of employee identification number as it relates to carbon monoxide when that's not connected to the manner of killing in this case and it's not in my recollection connected otherwise to the search, I think it would put it outside the bounds of the evaluation of the probative value versus prejudice resulting, and it carries the additionally implication of an attack on the honest or truthfulness of the Defendant in a fashion where it hasn't been raised as a defense or an element of character.

So at least in the case in chief I think that the obtaining of an employee -- employer identification number or application for receipt of carbon monoxide canisters and the research connected to carbon monoxide with regard to that, I find at this time that for the

State's case in chief that evidence should be excluded by the danger of unfair prejudice compared to the probative value of that.

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I think that the other evidence of research is admissible and relevant and is free of the danger of the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence as is discussed in Rule 403. I find that that issue does not present itself. There's not a danger of unfair prejudice as compared to the probative value. So that's Number 3.

I may want to revisit that after I examine the transcript and my notes with regard to what was testified to about the computer search. That would be my ruling at this time.

With regard to the Book of Business and that information which is in Number 4 and Number 5 according to what the parties have asserted that's talking about the fact of filing of financial documents. It is a fact. It's a judicial noticeable fact because I've looked at the domestic relations file. In looking at the domestic relations file the characterization of those as false and misleading is not something that I believe can be made. I've already made findings of that in connection with my findings on the Chronis hearing.

The statements in that sense are not hidden from the parties or hidden in real terms from the Court.